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Zusammenfassung
Fortschritte in den lebenswissenschaftlichen Arbeiten 
haben in den vergangenen Jahren neue und verbesserte 
Ansätze zur Bekämpfung von Krankheiten und zur 
Beförderung von Gesundheit im Allgemeinen gebracht. 
Solche Forschungen sind weiterhin essentiell. Gleichzei-
tig können die Ergebnisse einiger dieser Arbeiten für 
nichtfriedliche Zwecke missbraucht werden; sie sind mit 
einem sogenannten Dual-Use-Charakter (doppelte Ver-
wendbarkeit) behaftet, der es besonders schwer macht, 
den Nutzen zu ernten und gleichzeitig die damit verbun-
denen Risiken zu minimieren. Die relevanten Entwick-
lungen beziehen sich vor allem auf die Forschungsberei-
che der Genomforschung, der synthetischen Biologie, 
der Systembiologie, der Bioinformatik, der Nanotechno-
logie und der Targeted-Delivery-Technologien. Auf 
internationaler Ebene kommen die Bemühungen sehr 
schleppend voran, Risikomanagementprogramme, die 
die Gefahren des Missbrauchs entschärfen könnten, 
abzufassen und zu etablieren. Die Entwicklungen in 
Wissenschaft und Technik standen stets im Mittelpunkt 
der 1972 vereinbarten B-Waffenkonvention (Überein-
kommen vom 10. April 1972 über das Verbot der Ent-
wicklung, Herstellung und Lagerung bakteriologischer 
(biologischer) Waffen und von Toxinwaffen sowie über 
die Vernichtung solcher Waffen) und mit den rasanten 
Entwicklungen in den Lebenswissenschaften in den letz-
ten Jahren haben diese kontinuierlich an Relevanz 
gewonnen. Seit 2005 werden die Mitgliedsstaaten der 
Konvention speziell aufgefordert, ihre Aktivitäten in 
Richtung Risikovorsorge bzw. Risikomanagement 
bekannt zu machen, sodass optimale Verfahren (best 
practices) ausfindig gemacht werden können. Bis jetzt 
haben sehr wenige Staaten darauf reagiert, nämlich die 
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika (USA), deren Risiko-
managementsystem schon implementiert worden ist 
und die Niederlande, dessen Risikovorsorgeprogramm 
zwar abgefasst aber noch nicht implementiert ist. Jetzt 
hat auch Deutschland reagiert. In Antwort auf eine 
Anfrage der Bundesregierung an den Deutschen Ethik-
rat, hat der Ethikrat eine Stellungnahme dazu verfasst, 
mit Empfehlungen zu einem kohärenten Regelungssys-
tem, das den Missbrauch von Forschung und For-
schungsergebnissen in den Lebenswissenschaften mini-
mieren und verhindern soll. Um auf der internationalen 
Ebene vorwärts zu kommen und bis andere Staaten die-
sen Beispielen folgen, sollten die Mitgliedsstaaten der 
BWC schon mit diesen drei detaillierten Risikomanage-
mentprogrammen in einem Arbeitsgruppenformat 
beginnen, optimale Verfahren aus diesen Systemen aus-
findig zu machen, die mit allen Mitgliedsstaaten als 
Wegweiser zur Risikovorsorge diskutiert werden kön-
nen.
I. Introduction: life sciences work of relevance to 
biosecurity
Advances in science and technology over the past few 
years have initiated new and improved approaches to 
countering disease and promoting health in general. This 
progress in the life sciences is absolutely essential. At the 
same time, the rapidity with which the advances occur 
and the possibilities for misuse that they reveal give us a 
clear indication that we have reached a critical point in 
being able to deal effectively with the biosecurity impli-
cations of these developments.
Progress in genomics is enabling the ever increasingly 
rapid and cost effective analysis of genes and their regu-
latory elements as well as facilitating high through-put 
nucleic acid synthesis, which in turn is enabling the mo-
dification of even very complex microorganisms to meet 
designer specifications.1 Synthetic biology is advancing 
beyond sophisticated engineering of microorganisms to 
perform new tasks by outfitting them with DNA-based 
biological circuits built from standardized biological 
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parts.2 Sub-fields of synthetic biology are now reaching 
into the realm of creating artificial life from chemical 
components.3
Advances in systems biology are revealing new poten-
tial targets for disrupting the careful balance of vital phy-
siological functions.4 This is a field of biology that seeks 
to understand the working of complex physiological sys-
tems within and between cells on a molecular level. An 
enormous amount of knowledge is accumulating 
through this work that pinpoints vital cellular targets 
and ways of affecting those systems; either positively, to-
wards better health or negatively, towards disruption of 
the proper, balanced function of those systems.
Bioinformatics has to do with a whole array of enabling 
functions for modern life sciences work, including the sto-
rage and recall of genomics data, the directed design of gene 
segments and genes on up to entire genomes of microorga-
nisms, directed design of therapeutic drugs as well as the 
modelling of the interactions between molecules.5 Bioinfor-
matics also enable the global distribution and exchange of 
knowledge. Indeed, bioinformatics plays a decisive role in 
all areas of life sciences work today.
Nanotechnology is the study of materials on a nano 
scale (a nanometer is one-billionth of a meter). It is most 
relevant for biosecurity in the creation of nanoparticles 
with a size between 1-100 nanometers. These particles 
can be designed to have specific size, form and physical-
chemical properties that can promote improved delivery 
of bioactive substances such as pharmaceutical drugs ac-
ross nasal and respiratory passages as well as the blood-
brain-barrier for therapeutic purposes.6 At the same 
time nanoparticles coupled with new methods for ma-
king substances more soluble across mucous membranes 
could be used to deliver biological warfare agents more 
effectively, for example in the form of aerosols.
Indeed, concerns about advances in science and tech-
nology that could lead to the creation of novel biological 
warfare agents are compounded by the recognition that 
new and improved ways of delivering bioactive substan-
ces are already at hand and will be developed further at a 
rapid pace.7 As outlined above, nanotechnology has con-
tributed greatly to improved delivery of bioactive subs-
tances over the aerosol route, the method that has always 
been preferred for delivering biological weapons.8 How-
ever, the emerging interest over the past decade in deve-
loping viral vectors to deliver vaccines and for use in tar-
geted cancer, drug and immunotherapy9 has caused 
biosecurity concerns that this may be an effective way to 
deliver biological agents as weapons. The strategy is to 
outfit viruses with foreign genes encoding bioactive sub-
stances that will be delivered to a host after infection by 
the virus. The host activates those genes to direct the 
synthesis of the encoded substance, which then exerts its 
effects.
Viruses are very efficient in infecting cells and delive-
ring genes, nevertheless, non-viral vectors (artificial viru-
ses) are being actively developed to overcome some of 
the disadvantages of viral vectors such as safety, manu-
facturing problems, host immunity and limited carrying 
capacities.10 The most recent developments in this direc-
tion are the so-called nanorobots.11 These are nanopar-
ticles composed of a polymer-based framework enclo-
sing a bioactive substance e.g. DNA or protein. They are 
outfitted with surface molecules that can dock onto desi-
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gnated cells, signalling the vector to open up and release 
its bioactive payload. Some nanorobots are being develo-
ped to be taken up by cells and upon a signal, release 
their bioactive substances inside the cell. Even though 
non-viral vectors have not been as efficient as viral vec-
tors in delivering genes to host cells,12 there is a great 
deal of interest in developing them further.
II. The International Governance Problem
Urgent attention is needed in dealing adequately and res-
ponsibly with the risks of misuse that are inherent in life 
science work of dual use character. Although there has 
been a substantial amount of thought put into minimi-
zing the risks involved in this work, the governance pro-
posals made to date are not in any way keeping pace with 
the developments.
In effect, all work with biological agents for non-
peaceful purposes is prohibited by the Biological Wea-
pons Convention (BWC)13, which was agreed in 1972 
and came into force in 1975. In Article I of the conventi-
on, each member state14 agrees never to develop, stock-
pile or otherwise acquire or retain biological agents that 
have no justification for peaceful purposes. Thus, at the 
same time, the convention allows work with all biologi-
cal agents for peaceful purposes. With this formulation, 
called the general purpose criterion, the convention pro-
hibits biological weapons, but does not hinder scientific 
progress, and it is not a captive of the technological deve-
lopment of the 1970s. In this regard, all new technologi-
cal developments in the life sciences to date are unequi-
vocally covered by the convention, as has been determi-
ned at all Review Conferences of the BWC, including the 
last one in 2011.15 This is the great strength of the conven-
tion.
At the same time, the problem with the convention in 
this context is that it has no effective way of assuring 
compliance. It was not politically possible at the time of 
negotiation of the BWC for the states parties to agree on 
a verification regime16, and the text gives no indication 
of how to deal with the biosecurity risk of misuse of ma-
terial and knowledge resulting from dual use work in the 
life sciences. Negotiations starting in 1995 over a Proto-
col to the BWC that would strengthen the convention 
with, among other measures, a detailed verification pro-
gramme, failed in 2001 to be agreed upon.17 In Article IV 
of the convention the states parties are charged not only 
with prohibiting biological weapons but also with pre-
venting their (mis)use, again without providing any pro-
cedure for accomplishing this.
The evolution of the work of the BWC has taken place 
at different levels of undertakings. At the top level, the 
BWC itself contains legally binding obligations, or the 
things that States Parties MUST do. No new legally bin-
ding measures have been agreed since the treaty was sig-
ned and came into force. At the next level, the review 
conferences, which are generally held every five years, 
reach “additional agreements” as to how to implement 
the obligations of the BWC; these are considered to be 
politically (as opposed to legally) binding obligations, or 
the things the States Parties SHOULD do. Finally, the in-
tersessional processes (ISPs), yearly meetings which have 
taken place since 2003 between the review conferences, 
have led to the development of “common understan-
dings” on elements that might be useful; these are shared 
national positions on mechanisms that might strengthen 
the implementation of the BWC, or the things States Par-
ties COULD do.18 These common understandings are 
clearly the weakest form of agreements reached in the 
BWC process.
In this regard the states parties to the BWC have since 
2003, within the ISPs, tried to “promote common under-
standings and effective action” on specific topics of grea-
test relevance to the BWC that could strengthen the con-
vention. One topic that continues to be taboo is, how- 
ever, verification of the convention; instead, states par-
ties try to reach agreements on other topics, which have 
over the years included strengthening the implementati-
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on of the convention, cooperation and assistance within 
the convention, surveillance of disease outbreaks, securi-
ty and oversight of biological agents, codes of conduct 
and awareness-raising education of life scientists about 
dual-use biosecurity issues. Under the “effective action” 
part of the process, states parties are called upon to re-
commend specific actions that can, however, only be ag-
reed on at the next scheduled Review Conference. The 
BWC is presently in the middle of its third ISP (2012-
2015), which was established at the Seventh Review Con-
ference (Fn 15). So far most observers agree that the Sta-
tes Parties have reached many common understandings, 
but have promoted little to no effective action.19
For example, the topic of the review of developments 
in science and technology of relevance to the convention 
has been intensively dealt with as one of three standing 
agenda items in this present ISP. Within this process the 
mandate is to (1) review the most relevant developments, 
(2) consider the implications of these developments and 
(3) recommend risk management measures that can mi-
tigate (minimize) the risks that these developments car-
ry. There has up to now been much activity in the way of 
dealing with the first two elements, but very little consi-
deration of the governance issue (Fn 19). Nevertheless, 
the member states have been called upon to communica-
te their efforts and experiences in implementing measu-
res for strengthening biological risk management, volun-
tary codes of conduct and education and awareness-rai-
sing about dual-use biosecurity issues in the life sciences. 
Only a few states have responded to this call with the 
drafting of biosecurity-oriented risk management poli-
cies giving detailed descriptions of procedure; these po-
licies include the oversight system of the USA20, which 
has been implemented, and the proposed oversight and 
awareness-raising system of The Netherlands, which is in 
the implementation process.21
III. Germany’s Response
Now Germany has acted in this context. In 2012 the 
Federal Government of Germany commissioned the 
German Ethics Council to draft an opinion as to whether 
the existing regulations and other measures such as 
codes of conduct were sufficient to minimize the risk of 
or even prevent the misuse of developments in life scien-
ces work. The German Ethics Council took this opportu-
nity to analyze the issue of freedom versus responsibility 
in life science work in the context of biosecurity. It came 
to the conclusion that additional biosecurity regulatory 
measures were needed, and made recommendations to 
the German government in 2014 toward a coherent regu-
latory system for minimizing/preventing the misuse of 
advances in life sciences work.22
The recommendations contain a balanced set of mea-
sures that allow scientists working in the field to de-
monstrate that they act responsibly in carrying out their 
research programmes, with sufficient regulations to gui-
de them in taking the steps needed in this process in or-
der to minimize misuse of their work. Education of life 
scientists about dual-use-biosecurity issues is placed first 
in the recommendations, reflecting the recognition that 
this is considered to be an essential biosecurity gover-
nance measure; that only when life scientists understand 
the issues will they be able to recognize the potential 
risks and be convinced of the necessity for minimizing 
those risks. Indeed, Peter Hale, founder of the Foundati-
on for Vaccine Research stated in an interview in Sci-
enceInsider that the Opinion “for the first time, contains 
a set of substantive recommendations that will hopefully 
inform/inspire debate and action in other countries” and 
that “The report should be required reading for govern-
ments around the world”.23
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Until other states follow these examples, a way for-
ward at the international level would be for the States 
Parties to the BWC to start analyzing these three detailed 
risk management systems in a working group setting, 
with conclusions and recommendations about best 
practices reported to the next Meeting of States Parties as 
guidelines for those states that as yet have no risk ma-
nagement programme in place.
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